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Abstract
China’s dual function for Australia as a chief source of economic opportunity and 
security concern has complicated Australia’s foreign and defence policies over the 
last decades. This paper aims to depict how Australia has dealt with China’s dual 
significance, and identify Australia’s struggles to maximise its own economic and 
security interests, tracing the need to strengthen cooperative economic relations 
with China while simultaneously endeavouring to maintain a robust alliance 
with the United States. The worst scenario for Australia would be for its largest 
trading partner and its significant ally to collide. Australia thus accentuates the 
significance of coordinated efforts to encourage China to take a constructive, not 
hegemonic, behaviour through, for instance, engaging it in multilateral forums.
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Introduction
East Asia has emerged as an increasingly significant region in international 
politics and economics, and the global acknowledgement of the significance 
of East Asia has been mainly attributed to the rise of China. The rise of China 
means that a traditional political power that once lacked economic prowess is 
emerging as a potentially true superpower whose political influence is now backed 
by continuous high economic growth, impacting both political and economic 
spheres. This view was more fully developed after the global financial crisis, 
which represents both the eroding international influence of the United States and 
the growing international role of China with the world largest foreign reserves. A 
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great number of nations are affected by this epochal phenomenon, and Australia is 
not an exception.
For instance, in the wake of the global financial crisis, Beijing implemented a 
quick and decisive injection of a four trillion-yuan package in November 2008 to 
boost domestic demand through ten measures, including the expansion of trans-
portation networks and the development of health and education infrastructures. 
Australia soon became one of the largest beneficiaries from this package, as this 
created a substantial degree of demand for iron ore and coal. Consequently, the 
average price of iron ore in 2009 was doubled due to rising demand mainly in 
China, contributing to massive amounts of investment in mining industries in Aus-
tralia. This China-led energy boom was instrumental in aiding Australia’s quick 
recovery from the global financial crisis and 3.5 percent growth in 2009. Deputy 
Prime Minister Swan declared in September 2010: “We are located in the right 
part of the world at the right time for the first time in our history,”1 representing a 
view that Australia’s ‘tyranny of distance’ sentiment was ending, thanks to China 
and other East Asian states.
On the other hand, China has been regarded as a threat in Australia; a public 
poll conducted by Australia’s Lowy Institute in 2008 showed that 64% of Aus-
tralian respondents disagreed that Australia’s interest would not be harmed if 
China gained more power and influence.2 This concern was partly reflected in 
a defence white paper published the following year, which asserted, “A major 
power of China’s stature can be expected to develop a globally significant military 
capability befitting its size. But the pace, scope and structure of China's military 
modernisation have the potential to give its neighbours cause for concern if not 
carefully explained, and if China does not reach out to others to build coincidence 
regarding its military plans.” China’s dual function for Australia as a chief source 
of economic opportunity and a security concern was summarised, by Prime Min-
ister Julia Gillard at the beginning of the Asian Century white paper published in 
November 2011, as Australia’s “largest export market and largest trading partner 
neither a democracy nor part of our alliance system, a nation whose economic 
transformation is in turn transforming the economic and strategic balance of our 
world.”3 The transformed economic balance caused by China’s rise has been a 
positive development Australia finds imperative to capitalise on, like many other 
1 Sydney Morning Herald, May 22, 2012.
2 Fergus Hanson, “2008 Lowy Poll: Australians Wary over China’s Rise,” Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, September 30, 2008, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/
post/2008/09/30/2008-Lowy-Institute-Poll-China.aspx
3 Julia Gillard, Speech to the AsiaLink and Asia Society Lunch, Melbourne, Australia, Sep-
tember 28, 2011, http://www.pm.gov.au/press-office/speech-asialink-and-asia-society-lunch-
melbourne
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nations, while the change in the strategic balance has been carefully managed to 
minimize security and defence concerns. This paper aims to depict how Australia 
has dealt with China’s dual significance and identify Australia’s struggles to max-
imise its own economic and security interests: the need to strengthen cooperative 
economic relations with China while simultaneously endeavouring to maintain a 
robust alliance with the United States. The worst scenario for Australia would be 
for its largest trading partner and significant ally to collide. As a third option, Aus-
tralia finds it imperative to make an effort to encourage China to take a construc-
tive, not hegemonic, behaviour by engaging it in multilateral forums.
1. China’s Economic Rise
Australia’s firm interest in maintaining a strong economic relationship with China 
has been evident in most of all Australian leaders’ statements given the fact that 
China has been the world’s largest importer of wool and iron ore, Australia’s 
two major exporting products. This interest became more apparent when 
China overtook Japan as Australia’s largest trading partner in 2007. Australia’s 
possibility of concluding an FTA with China, which was seen as an important shift 
in Australia’s strategic thinking, was reflected in the Australian media’s increasing 
coverage of China rather than Japan.4 Prime Minister Julia Gillard visited 
Japan and China in April 2011, both of which were well covered by Australia’s 
media; but the foci of the two visits were different. Gillard was highlighted 
by the Japanese media as the first foreign leader to visit the areas substantially 
demolished by the 3.11 Earthquake and Tsunami, illustrating Australia’s serious 
consideration about Japan as a political and strategic partner.5 While the United 
States, an ally of Japan, provided enormous material, personnel, and moral 
support with Japan through the Tomodachi Operation, a visit by its political leader 
was not realised until Vice President Joe Biden visited Fukushima Prefecture 
in August 2011. This indicates the political significance of Gillard’s visit to the 
town of Minami-sanriku in Miyagi Prefecture. She subsequently visited China 
with 150 Australian business leaders, the purpose of which was purely business-
driven; Australia signed an agreement with China on an annual supply of 4.3 
million tons of liquid natural gas (LNG) over the next 20 years, one of Australia’s 
largest international energy deals. In fact, Gillard was criticised at home for taking 
no action against China’s poor human rights record, as was symbolised by the 
continued detention of 2010 Nobel laureate, Liu Xiaobo.
4 David Walton, “Australia and Japan,” in Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World 
Affairs, 2001-2005, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Oxford University Press, 2007).
5 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, April 23, 2011.
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The fact that Australia has continued to rely on China for economic growth, 
as seen in its exports to China accounting for nearly 25% of its total exports in 
2010, represents Australia’s economic vulnerability with China. Therefore, it is 
imperative for Australia to intensify efforts to broaden and diversify its trade and 
investment routes and options. India, Australia’s third-largest export market, has 
emerged as a potential trading partner to help Australia diversify its trade direc-
tion. The usefulness of India in this context can be seen in a 2011-2012 budget 
paper that stressed the need for reform in Australia’s coal and mining industries 
to maintain and hopefully boost the current growth rate; India is juxtaposed with 
China as follows:
The mining boom is an early manifestation for Australia of the shift in the 
world’s economic geography from west to east. As China and India continue 
to develop, the growing cities now driving demand for Australia’s mineral 
resources will be populated by an increasingly wealthy and upwardly 
mobile middle class, with incomes and tastes to match. Increasing consumer 
purchasing power and changing spending patterns will open up new, often 
unforeseen, opportunities for Australia — well beyond those flowing from the 
current mining boom.6
Australia’s bilateral and regional trading arrangements, which include India, 
are considered ways to reduce its dependence on the Chinese market and illustrate 
Australia’s acknowledgement of the risks of its heavy dependence on the Chinese 
market for economic growth. This point was mentioned in a new trade strategy re-
port, launched in April 2011, which pointed to the primacy of the multilateral trad-
ing system, including the WTO, and viewed bilateral and regional FTAs as sup-
plementary to support the multilateral trading system. Nonetheless, given that the 
WTO’s Doha Development Round negotiations have been bogged down over the 
last years, the pursuit of bilateral and regional trading arrangements is a more re-
alistic path toward reducing trade barriers and diversifying dependence on China’s 
market. As this trade policy report also suggests, Gillard’s highest priority in terms 
of regional trading arrangements is placed on the conclusion of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPP), which excludes China as a member. This statement 
was, however, made possible only because Australia still has hope to eventually 
secure China’s gigantic market preferentially through the conclusion of a bilat-
eral FTA, which Australia has been negotiating since 2006, as well as a regional 
trading arrangement such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RECP) agreement, which consists of ASEAN+6 member countries.
6 Australian Government, Budget Paper No. 1, May 10, 2011, http://www.budget.gov.au/2011-
12/content/bp1/html/bp1_bst4-03.htm
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One significant political implication of growing mutual economic interdepend-
ence between Australia and China is Australia’s tendency not to raise issues or 
contest China’s political position on issues China hesitates to acknowledge, such 
as human rights. In other words, while China’s economic development and mas-
sive capacity to absorb natural resources continues to be seen as the most signifi-
cant factor helping Australia’s economic growth, their mutual interdependence 
makes Australia’s capacity to maintain its voice on China’s political and military 
problems vulnerable, as seen in the case of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) 
and a quadrilateral approach.
2. Australia’s Vulnerability: Trilateral Strategic 
Dialogue
According to White, an approach to trilateral cooperation among Australia, Japan, 
and the United States was generated accidentally at the 2001 AUSMIN in Sydney, 
the first round held during the Bush administration. However, this accident was 
surely associated with Australia’s vulnerability against China. At a press confer-
ence, when asked about the “Asian NATO” issue in his meeting with Downer, 
Powell replied by mentioning something related to a forum among U.S. allies in 
Asia. Downer, who hoped to avoid antagonizing China with such a politically sen-
sitive idea, tried to redirect attention toward the idea of a trilateral dialogue, which 
Australia had previously been interested in and which Downer had not intended 
to say anything about. In White’s words, “the idea would not have been aired at 
all had Powell not responded as he did to the question.”7 Nevertheless, Downer’s 
adlib catalysed the process toward realization, and several meetings at the senior 
official level, involving Richard Armitage, Ashton Calvert, and Yukio Takeuchi, 
were held from 2002 to 2004.
In early 2005, the elevation of the trilateral senior official meeting to the minis-
terial level was announced by Condoleezza Rice, the new U.S. Secretary of State. 
This elevation was mainly attributed to growing concerns of the United States and 
Japan about Australia’s divergent interests regarding the rise of China. Australia’s 
actions in relation to China have not followed the preferred course of Japan and 
the United States. White cited three evidences in which the United States found 
Australia’s distinctive interests in and approaches to China: 1) the equal treatment 
to Presidents Bush and Hu, who visited Australia on consecutive days in Octo-
7 Hugh White, “Trilateralism and Australia: Australia and the Trilateral Security Dialogue with 
America and Japan,” in Asia Pacific Security: U.S., Australia and Japan and the New Security 
Triangle, ed. William T. Tow et al. (Routledge, 2007), 107-108.
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ber 2003; 2) Downer’s statement on Australia’s lack of obligation to support the 
United States in any conflict against China over Taiwan in August 2004; and 3) 
Australia’s rejection to join the United States and Japan in pressing the European 
Union not to eliminate restrictions on arms sales to China in February 2005.8 Aus-
tralia’s softer stance on China was partly arising from its firm interest in maintain-
ing a strong economic relationship with China, the world’s largest importer of 
wool and iron ore. This interest was to become even stronger as China overtook 
Japan as Australia’s largest trading partner in 2007.
The possibility of concluding an FTA with China was seen as an important shift 
in Australia’s strategic thinking, which was reflected in the Australian media’s 
increasing coverage of China rather than Japan.9 The Australian senior diplomat 
in charge of Northeast Asian affairs acknowledged that Australia’s political and 
security relations with China were partly influenced by “functional distance;” As 
Australia tends to find political and security relations with Indonesia very diffi-
cult, Japan does so with China, and vice versa. The diplomat did not conceal the 
influence of China’s trade factor on Australia’s softer stance: “Australia has found 
itself in a difficult situation in terms of its commitment to improving China’s hu-
man rights records or promoting democracy, given China’s growing significance 
in Australia’s trade.”10
In response, Rice and Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso came all the way to 
Sydney in March 2006 to “air their shared concerns about Australia’s growing ac-
commodation with China,” an issue that was “indeed uppermost in their minds.”11 
Nevertheless, their joint statement merely mentioned that three foreign ministers 
“welcomed China's constructive engagement in the region and concurred on the 
value of enhanced cooperation with other parties such as ASEAN and the Repub-
lic of Korea,” a stance that reflected well Australia’s anxiety that the TSD that “has 
made Beijing deeply uneasy” would not been seen as a way of containing China.12 
Australia continued to take a different policy stance toward China and developed 
relations almost autonomously. For instance, in April 2006, while the United 
States still harboured concerns that uranium exported to China might be used for 
military purposes, an agreement was reached between Wen Jiabao and Australian 
Prime Minister Howard for the export of 20,000 tons of uranium from Australia 
to China over ten years. The announcement of the establishment of an Australia–
8 Ibid., 108.
9 David Walton, “Australia and Japan,” in Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World 
Affairs, 2001-2005, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Oxford University Press, 2007).
10 Personal interview, Canberra, August 2, 2006.
11 White, 109.
12 Greg Sheridan, The Partnership: The Inside Story of the U.S.-Australian Alliance under 
Bush and Howard (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2006), 201.
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China strategic dialogue on 6 September 2007 can be seen as a diplomatic balanc-
ing act by Howard to substantially enhance relations with China while maintain-
ing close security ties with the United States and Japan.13
Accordingly, Japan’s support for Australia’s inclusion in East Asian commu-
nity-building, which aimed to enhance the role of its partnership with Australia 
as a valued partner and counter China’s ambition to dominate the region, were 
not realised. For instance, during the first EAS held in December 2005 in Kuala 
Lumpur, China insisted that ASEAN+3, rather than the EAS, be used as a fo-
rum for discussing East Asian community-building. China’s approach contrasted 
clearly with that of Japan, which advocated a wider membership including three 
democratic nations (i.e., Australia, India and New Zealand) to reduce China’s in-
fluence. However, Japanese policy specialists such as Noboru Hatakeyama, who 
played a pivotal role in promoting Japan’s FTA policy, attribute the difficulty in 
forming a regional community in East Asia to the fact that some regional countries 
like China do not share values toward freedom, democracy, or human rights with 
Japan.14 Japan’s claim on a wider membership prevailed for the inaugural EAS 
partly due to India’s strong claim on the use of the EAS as a vehicle for East Asian 
community-building. This view was also supported by Indonesia, which worried 
about the negative consequence of China’s growing regional power on ASEAN’s 
influence, and favoured involving countries like India and Australia to provide 
balance.15 Nevertheless, Australia, rather than Indonesia and India, was quoted 
by a senior official of Japan’s MOFA as not exercising a strong influence on this 
battle,16 although a senior Australian diplomat’s rebuttal claimed that Howard, 
who was eventually impressed by the EAS’s function, could not take a leading 
role in agenda-setting as Australia was a newcomer.17 In short, the TSD process 
has not so far fulfilled the function the United States initially intended since it has 
failed to press Australia to take a similar policy stance on China.
13 David Walton, “Australia and Japan: Towards a New Security Partnership?” Japanese 
Studies 28, no. 1 (2008): 81.
14 Noboru Hatakeyama, “East Asian Community: Prospects and Problems towards a Regional 
FTA,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 25, 2005.
15 Takashi Terada, “The Origins of ASEAN+6: Japan’s Initiatives and the Agent-Structure 
Framework,” The Pacific Review (2009).
16 Personal interview, Tokyo, December 24, 2005.
17 Personal interview, Canberra, August 2, 2006.
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3. Australia’s Vulnerability: Quadrilateral Approach
A quadrilateral approach to China was formulated by Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe and Australia was viewed as an essential part as Abe considered 
Australia a nation that shared common values with the Unites States and Japan. 
However, a concealed objective behind the development was to encircle China, 
and Australia refused participation to not harm relations with China, illustrating 
another example of Australia’s vulnerability toward China.
As the second Armitage-Nye report highlights, the most fundamental element 
that politically connects the United States, Japan, and Australia for security co-
operation is shared values such as democracy, human rights, and religious free-
dom.18 The significance of those values was stressed by President Bush and Prime 
Minister Abe despite their failure to forge a strong personal rapport, which had 
flourished between Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi. For instance, in 
September 2007, Bush proposed the formation of a new Asia Pacific Democracy 
Partnership to “provide a venue in which free nations will work together to sup-
port democratic values, strengthen democratic institutions, and assist those who 
are working to build and sustain free societies across the Asia Pacific region.”19 In 
his first administrative policy speech at the Diet in January 2007, Prime Minister 
Abe who hoped to conduct “assertive diplomacy” urged the need to strengthen 
partnerships with nations that shared those values, referring to Australia and India 
as such nations.20 This value-oriented foreign policy approach promoted by Abe 
found India as an additional regional power with which three nations could work 
together to develop a regional mechanism to engage China peacefully. The same 
purpose was embedded in the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” concept promoted 
by his foreign minister, Aso.
While Abe ceased prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, to which 
Koizumi had made an annual event that damaged relations with China and Korea, 
with a view toward repairing those relations, his highly ideologically-coloured 
foreign policy approach, as seen in the promotion of ties with nations that share 
“common values” with Japan, had already been concretely expressed in his book. 
Abe insisted on organizing a summit meeting among Japan, Australia, the United 
States, and India, all of which, he believed, share universal values such as de-
mocracy and respect for human rights. The purpose behind this assertion was to 
18 Armitage and Nye, 19.
19 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S. Commitment to Strengthen Forces of 
Freedom, Prosperity in Region,” September 7, 2007.
20 http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/abespeech/2007/01/26sisei.html
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discuss ways to make East Asian countries, including China, accept those val-
ues.21 For instance, in his speech at the Indian Parliament on 22 August 2007, Abe 
introduced a new regional concept, a “broader Asia,” by stating that “the Pacific and 
the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom 
and of prosperity. A ‘broader Asia’ that broke away geographical boundaries is 
now beginning to take on a distinct form.”22 Abe’s message to India was to further 
promote regional cooperation within this regional framework by “incorporating 
the United States of America and Australia.” The purpose behind this proposal 
was mentioned later in a speech: “I feel that it is imperative that the democratic 
nations located at opposite edges of these seas deepen the friendship among their 
citizens at every possible level.”23 One reason Abe needed to introduce the concept 
of “broader Asia,” despite Australia and India becoming official EAS members 
and being acknowledged as East Asian nations, was to enable engagement by the 
United States, which was an EAS member but which Abe considered essential to 
this regional concept. In this sense, Abe was more explicit in expressing its de-
sire to promote an exclusive group of democratic countries centred on the United 
States than Koizumi, and he was seen as “the most vocal supporter” of the quadri-
lateral forum.24 A senior Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade official declared 
that Abe came to view Australia as a significant strategic partner after Australia 
decided to increase help for Japan’s Self Defense Forces (JSDF) in Iraq and to 
promote Japan’s effort to conclude the Australia-Japan FTA feasibility study.25 Ja-
pan’s ASEAN+6 approach, embodied as the establishment of the EAS in 2005 and 
the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) in 2007, which 
include Australia and India, was developed as part of Abe’s foreign policy agenda, 
and the issue of how to respond to the rise of China was a common influence on 
both political and economic regionalism schemes.
Abe’s support for the quadrilateral approach sustained by his emphasis on val-
ues such as democracy and human rights came to be strengthened after he met 
with the U.S. Vice-President Dick Cheney in February 2007. They discussed the 
idea of India’s possible participation with Japan, Australia, and the United States, 
to form a quadrilateral grouping of like-minded democratic nations.26 This propos-
al led to an experimental attempt to form the grouping through an informal meet-
21 Shinzo Abe, Utukushii Kuni-he [Towards a Beautiful Country] (Bungei Shunjyusha, 2006).
22 Shinzo Abe, “Confluence of the Two Seas,” (speech, Parliament of the Republic of India, 
August 22, 2007.
23 Ibid.
24 Chanlett-Avery and Vaughn,14.
25 Personal interview, Canberra, August 2, 2006.
26 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Visit to Japan of the Honorable Dick Cheney, Vice 
President of the United States of America (Summary),” February 22, 2007, http://www.mofa.
go.jp/region/n-america/us/vpv0702.html
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ing in May 2007, participated by representatives from the four nations as a side-
line meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). China was wary of such a 
move and issued “formal diplomatic protests to Australia, Japan, and India out of 
concern that they were forming a security alliance with the United States against 
China.”27 India’s participation in the framework can be rationalized by its com-
plex relations with China as seen in territorial disputes over Kashmir, Sikkim, and 
Anurachal Pradesh, which India might have wanted to discuss as a way of putting 
a pressure on China.
However, Australia was not keen to use shared values as a political tool to form 
an exclusive framework, as it was seen as an annoyance to China. For instance, 
in their meeting in Washington in July 2005, Howard was reported to have turned 
down President Bush’s request that the United States and Australia work together 
to “reinforce the need for China to accept certain values as ‘universal.’” Howard’s 
approach towards China was “to build on the things that we have in common, and 
not become obsessed with the things that make us different.”28
Australia’s reserved stance on China was shared more by Japan after Prime 
Minister Abe resigned in September 2007 and Yasuo Fukuda, who placed a great-
er emphasis on relations with China, replaced him. Fukuda naturally displayed lit-
tle enthusiasm for continuing with the four-nation strategic dialogue, and Stephen 
Smith, Australian Foreign Minister during the Rudd administration, also indicated 
that the dialogue had concerned China and that Australia had no intention of sup-
porting a framework of this type.29 One reason for Rudd’s decision to refuse to 
allow Australia’s uranium sales to India while supporting the International Atomic 
Energy Association’s approval of a uranium deal between India and the United 
States was not to provoke China, which tended to worry about the containment 
movement. The preconditions for the ASEAN+6 framework implemented to 
counter the perceived negative aspects of China’s rise have transformed with the 
change of administrations in the region. The political implications of this change 
(e.g., differences in values held by different nations) have eroded the will to pro-
mote the quadrilateral framework as a way of checking China’s growing regional 
influence. At the same time, they have eliminated the strategic value from partner-
ships among Japan, India, and Australia.
27 Chanlett-Avery and Vaughn, 3.
28 Straits Times, August 19, 2005.
29 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, February 16, 2008.
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4. Rise of Military China: Inevitable Balancing
The distance between Australia and China has allowed Australia to not be anxious 
about China’s military power. This so-called functional distance helped Australia’s 
relations with China develop comfortably, unlike Japan, which has struggled with 
China over maritime territories and historical interpretations originating from geo-
graphical proximity. An Australian senior official in charge of China relations has 
stated, “Australia has found itself in a difficult situation in terms of its commit-
ment to improving China’s human rights records or promoting democracy, given 
China’s growing significance in Australia’s trade.” However, closer relations with 
the United States, which has more concern over China’s military rise, has inevi-
tably transformed Australia’s traditional stance on China. China’s double-digit 
rises in declared defence spending the past two decades, and undeclared spending 
reported to be much higher, is a major concern shared by almost all Asia Pacific 
counties. If transparency were not secured, momentum for trilateral/quadrilateral 
defence cooperation between Australia, Japan, India, and the United States would 
be more firmly established. For the United States, Japan, and Australia, their ma-
jor trading partner (and foreign creditor to the United States) is also their major 
source of threat. Frequent consultations through more institutionalised frame-
works among the three nations are needed to identify their common approaches 
toward persuading China to engage regional stability.
Importantly, Australia under the Rudd administration intended to take more 
independent response to the military rise of China, as was articulated in a 2009 
defence white paper that saw China as potentially “the strongest Asian military 
power” and warned that “the pace, scope and structure of China’s military mod-
ernization have the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern if not care-
fully explained.” The defence white paper articulated Australia’s plan to hedge 
against a situation in which China challenged U.S. hegemony in the region by 
planning a military build-up over two decades. Rudd called this build-up “the 
most powerful, integrated and sophisticated set of military capabilities” Australia 
has had, which would include the acquisition of three air warfare destroyers, eight 
new frigates, and 12 new submarines by 2030. Given the statement by Admiral 
Wu Shengli, head of China’s navy, in April 2009 that the navy would “move faster 
in researching and building new-generation weapons to boost the ability to fight 
regional sea wars,” Australia’s declaration to see China as a major threat to its 
security represents its potential engagement in U.S. battles against China, or at 
least its continued military sophistication. In this case, Japan’s promise to acceler-
ate an array of defence cooperation initiatives with Australia, as declared by both 
countries’ defence ministers in December 2008, and Japan’s choice of India as the 
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third nation, after the United States and Australia, to launch a joint security decla-
ration in November 2008, appeared to lay a foundation for potential U.S. engage-
ment in a more formal multilateral defence and security arrangement if China’s 
maritime ambitions continued. Given President Obama’s Asia pivot strategy, 
in which Australia serves as a key player for U.S. military deployment, a 2013 
defence white paper, the first to be launched under Prime Minister Gillard, stresses 
Australia’s need to sustain American military presence and its Asia pivot strat-
egy, while it displays Australia’s changing views on China’s rise which Australia 
“welcomes”. The new assessment is based on a more optimistic future scenario, 
described as the United States and China being “able to maintain a constructive 
relationship”.
As a method of Australia’s preventive diplomacy, Kevin Rudd, when prime 
minister in 2008, called for an Asia Pacific Community (APC). A major rationale 
behind his proposal was the belief that there was no Asian regional institution 
that had “the ability to deal comprehensively with all of the economic, political 
and security issues” since none entailed together all of what he called essential 
participants, such as the United States, China, Japan, India, Russia, and Indonesia. 
The EAS, through the participation of the U.S. and Russian presidents in 2011, in 
addition to 16 other leaders, can be viewed as the most useful framework for deal-
ing with regional security issues. This can be seen in the way Rudd delineated in 
the APC idea and in the fact that one of the key agendas in the subsequent EAS 
held in Jakarta in November 2011 was the territorial disputes in the South China 
Sea, as President Obama already declared during his visit to Indonesia in Novem-
ber 2010. The United States and other democratic nations in the region, such as 
Australia, have begun to construct a rules-based framework that tackles traditional 
“hard” security issues, such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea with a 
hope that China would abide by it. 
This has been marked by a shift away from a focus on the ARF, which has the 
reputation of being more a discussion session than a meeting with clear politi-
cal goals, and toward emphasis on more substantive deliberations at the EAS, in 
which the United States is now a full participant. According to White, who asserts 
that power sharing between the United States and China is the best option for 
stopping the escalation of bilateral tension toward a disastrous military confronta-
tion, this shift was accompanied by Obama’s announcement in November 2011 
that 2,500 U.S. Marines would be stationed at the Australian Army’s Robertson 
Barracks in Darwin, representing an American attempt to push back China’s chal-
lenge to American primacy and Australia’s readiness to be engaged in the order-
building in the region, 
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5. Strong Shared Concern: Military Rise of China
America’s concern over China’s increasing military build-up was well reflected 
in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which declares China as “the 
greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive 
military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advan-
tages absent U.S. counter strategies.”30 Importantly, such a stark view of China’s 
increasing military spending as threatening the delicate security balance in East 
Asia has gradually percolated through Japan, as insinuated in defence white 
papers. Howard shared this concern over China’s growing military spending: “The 
pace and scope of its military modernization, particularly the development of new 
and disruptive capabilities such as the anti-satellite missile, could create misunder-
standings and instability in the region,”31 although Downer continued to be san-
guine about China by seeing China’s military budget as reasonable and benign.32
The military, rather than economic, rise of China is a shared concern among 
major states in the Asia Pacific including Australia. Although trilateral and quadri-
lateral ministerial processes have faced setbacks, to a different degree, defence co-
operation, including military exercises, has progressed. In June 2007, JSDF joined 
the U.S.-Australia joint the military exercise Talisman Saber for the first time as an 
observer. As this is designed to train both military forces to improve their “combat 
readiness and interoperability,”33 JSDF’s participation was expected to potentially 
help improve Japanese defence and intelligence capabilities within a broader trilat-
eral framework. Equipment compatibility was essential in joint military operation, 
and Australia’s decision to acquire “three destroyers equipped with the Aegis com-
bat system, the same system used by American and Japanese militaries,”34 was an 
initial step for its participation in trilateral defence cooperation. In October 2007, 
navies from the three countries conducted a drill near Kyushu, the first trilateral 
P-3C exercise, to simulate “search and rescue activities as well as an attack on a 
Japanese escort ship.”35 Singapore also joined these four nations in naval exercises 
in the Bay of Bengal in September 2007 with over 20,000 personnel, 28 ships, 150 
30 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2006, 
19.
31 Reuters News, July 5, 2007.
32 Mark Thompson, “The Japan-Australia Strategic Relationship: An Australian Perspective,” 
(paper submitted to the 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue, Canberra, 
December 10-11, 2007): 31.
33 http://www.defence.gov.au/exercises/ts07/default.htm
34 Dow Jones International News, June 5, 2007.
35 Chanlett-Avery and Vaughn, 12.
Australia and China’s Rise: Ambivalent and Inevitable Balancing
142 The Journal of Contemporary China Studies, Vol.2, No. 2
aircraft, and three aircraft carriers.36 Bristled by these exercises, China questioned 
whether this exercise may lead to an “Asian NATO,” despite U.S. insistence that 
“the exercises were not directed at any particular country.” Nevertheless, the U.S. 
Navy declared that the demonstration “provides a message to other militaries, and 
our own, that we are capable of operating together and that we work together with 
our regional partners to ensure stability in the region.”37
Rudd took a similar view on the military rise of China, as was articulated in a 
2009 defence white paper that saw China as potentially “the strongest Asian mili-
tary power” and warned that “the pace, scope and structure of China’s military 
modernization have the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern if not 
carefully explained.”38 The 2009 defence white paper articulated how Australia 
could hedge against a situation in which a militarily strong China backed by rapid 
economic growth might challenge U.S. hegemony in the area by planning a mili-
tary build-up over two decades, which Rudd called “the most powerful, integrated 
and sophisticated set of military capabilities Australia has had.”39 This build-up 
would include the acquisition of three air warfare destroyers, eight new frigates, 
and 12 new submarines by 2030. Given a statement by Admiral Wu Shengli, head 
of China’s navy, in April 2009 that the navy would “move faster in researching 
and building new-generation weapons to boost the ability to fight regional sea 
wars,”40 Australia’s declaration of China as a major threat to its security represents 
its potential engagement in U.S. battles against China, or at least its continued mil-
itary sophistication. In this case, Japan’s promise to accelerate an array of defence 
cooperation with Australia, as declared by the two countries’ defence ministers in 
December 2008, and Japan’s choice of India as the third nation, after the United 
States and Australia, to launch a joint security declaration in November 2008, ap-
peared to lay a foundation for potential U.S. engagement in a more formal multi-
lateral defence and security arrangement if China’s maritime ambitions continued.  
Yet, as touched upon earlier, the 2013 defence white paper “does not approach 
China as an adversary”, reflecting Gillard’s more nuanced stance on China which 
included her keener interest in expanding economic relations China, as seen in the 
agreement for the convertibility of the Australian and Chinese currencies in March 
2013. It nonetheless refers to the future scenario that hostile powers might employ 
coercion or intimidation in the Indo-Pacific zone and that miscalculation could 
escalate tensions in the South China Sea.  So, the 2013 paper is another product of 
36 United States Department of the Navy, “Kitty Hawk, Allies Complete Malabar Exercise,” 
U.S. Navy Press Release, September 10, 2007.
37 Ibid.
38 Australian Government Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific 
Century: Force 2030 (Canberra, 2009): 34.
39 The Economist, May 9, 2009.
40 The Australian, May 6, 2009.
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Australia’s struggle to balance between the maintenance of the alliance with the 
United States and the efforts not insult China.
Conclusion
Australia’s dual identity as a major natural resource and agricultural exporter 
and American loyal ally inevitably forces it to employ an economically friendly 
and militarily harsh stance against China. This means Australia has found it oc-
casionally difficult to act as a keen player in efforts to encircle China, as seen in 
its apathetic approach to the TSD and quadrilateral forums. Thus, “how defense 
cooperation can be strengthened without alienating China”41 is seen as a major 
task Australia needs to overcome. This stance is strongly encouraged by the fact 
that the energy boom arising from China’s skyrocketing demand for iron ore and 
coal risks faster inflation and requires higher interest rates, and the Australian 
dollar has been soaring. However, this cycle has made it difficult for non-energy 
sectors to export. Education, which brought 17 billion dollars to Australia in 2010, 
has suffered since studying in Australia is more expensive. Ranked after coal and 
iron ore as the most lucrative source of foreign currency earnings, the educational 
industry has developed mainly through attracting students from Asia, account-
ing for more than 70 percent of all students in Australia. More highly evaluated 
Australian dollars would make it more difficult for these students to pay tuition 
fees and cover living costs, and the total number of Asian students would be ex-
pected to decrease. As a result, subsidies paid for local students would be also re-
duced, possibly damaging the availability of a skilled and talented workforce. The 
Asian Century white paper, designed to seek a way of maximising opportunities to 
be presented by growing Asian markets, includes the agenda of “revamping trade 
policy,” which would be linked up with the diversification of Australia’s trade. 
The crux of the argument in terms of Australia’s future China policy is whether 
Australia’s decision to reduce the trade reliance on China will urge Australia’s 
concern over the military rise of China to develop, as was seen in its support for 
U.S. marine deployment in Darwin.
41 Alan Dupont, “Unsheathing the Samurai Sword: Japan's Changing Security Policy,” Lowy 
Institute Paper No. 3 (2004): 49.
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